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Full text of "Rapid Population Growth Consequences And Policy Implications"

146                                                                           RAPID POPULATION GROWTH-1I
some regions, remains to be fully tested. The relation between socioeconomic variables and fertility is clearly different within the different major cultural regions of the less developed world; quite different levels and kinds of development are associated with fertility reductions, for example, in east Asia and in Latin America. This confirms common sense and explains why efforts to relate socioeconomic measures and fertility "across the board" for all less developed countries have led to confusing results.
Finally, is there indeed a new or renewed demographic transition? The evidence suggests that there is. A rapidly growing number of countries of diverse cultural background have entered the natality transition since World War II and after a 25-year lapse in such entries. In these countries the transition is moving much faster then it did in Europe. This is probably related to the fact that progress in general is moving much faster in such matters as urbanization, education, health, communication, and often per capita income. If progress in modernization continues, notably in the larger countries, the demographic transition in the less developed world will probably be completed much more rapidly than it was in Europe.
It would be foolhardy, however, not to end on a word of caution. On any assumptions concerning the reduction of fertility that may occur with socio-economic progress, it still follows that one may anticipate and must accommodate an enormous increase in the world population and that these increases will be greatest precisely in those countries economically least well-equipped to absorb the increase in numbers.
REFERENCES
1.  Stolnitz, George J., "The Demographic Transition," Population:  The
Vital Revolution, Ronald Freedman, ed. New York: Doubleday, 1964. p. 30.
2.   United Nations, Population Newsletter, December 1969. p. 3.
3.  United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1968, and earlier issues. New
York.
4.  United Nations, Population and Vital Statistics Report. New York, April
1970.
5.  United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York, July 1970.
6.  United Nations, Population Bulletin, No. 7. New York, 1963.
7.  Lapham, Robert J., "Family Planning and Fertility in Tunisia," Demog-
raphy, May 1970. pp. 241-253.
8.  Kirk, Dudley, "Factors Affecting Moslem Natality," Family Planning and
Population Programs, Bernard Berelson, et al., eds. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966. pp. 561-579.
9.  Shorter, Frederic C., "Information on Fertility, Mortality and Population
Growth in Turkey," Population Index, January-March 1968. pp. 3-21. regarding desired family size, and the degree of success in the actual practice of family limitation.,.,..  Tn;..,n~   u~.,,, !/  \/i*in,,r,   o:-----,.,   .....i r>~,,i.*..atly varying quality, single figures should not be taken very seriously. Thus the extraordinarily high correlation of telephones (i.e., a surrogate for modern infrastructure) with natality is reduced from -0.94 to -0.88 when Argentina and Uruguay arc excluded.